the modern economy we may distinguish two fundamental paradigms according to the role they assign to time and uncertainty.
The exchange economy
The dominant paradigm in economic theory is the exchange economy, where people improve their welfare by exchanging goods, of which they produce more than they need.
Money is supposed to be a neutral means of exchange, which facilitates barter transactions, but otherwise can only cause harm and does not contribute to "real wealth".
The motivation for holding money derives from its convenience in carrying out exchanges. 5 If too much money is put into circulation, prices increase and inflation will distort the efficient allocation of resources by markets. Thus, monetarists emphasize the control of money supply and price stability as primary objectives for monetary policy.
This is the core idea behind Milton Friedman's monetarism, but it has deep roots in the exchange paradigm of classical economic thought, starting with John Locke, David
Hume and Adam Smith.
Continuing this line of thought, neoclassical economics has shown that exchanging goods in spot markets in proportion to their marginal utility will maximize individuals'
welfare. Subsequently the rational expectations revolution has introduced an intertemporal dimension to the exchange economy. In these models utility is not only maximized by market transactions today, but also by exchanges into the indefinite future. As a consequence, modern economic theory starts with the assumption of "complete markets", where there is a system of markets for every good. By carefully defining "good" to include the date and environment in which a commodity is consumed, economists are able to consider consumption, production and investment choices in a multi-period, risky world. They can do so using largely the same utility theory originally developed to analyze timeless certainty (Flood, 1991) . The only additional dimension introduced by time is the choice of trading present against future consumption according to a given rate of time preference. Complete markets provide consumers, producers and investors with perfect flexibility in allocating payoffs and planning for uncertain contingencies, so that asset prices are always and everywhere the "correct" prices. This assumption is called the "Efficient Market Hypothesis". Markets for futures and options are shown to improve the efficiency of marketplaces and this has far-reaching implications for regulatory policy. Even if it is acknowledged that in the real world markets are not complete, the Efficient Market Hypothesis still serves as a theoretical benchmark. In practical terms this approach has reduced uncertainty to calculable risk and has set off the dramatic development of financial derivative products and markets, through hedge funds, forward contracts, futures options, swaps and similar products.
In political terms, the idea that every contingent state of the world could be traded on a market opened the door for the neoliberal distortion of liberalism. If markets are complete and efficient, everything, including externalities, can be traded and there is no place for distributional issues or concern for material equality. where there are markets for contingent claims, which span all possible states of nature (all possible contingencies and outcomes), and in which intertemporal budget constraints are always satisfied by assumption, default, bankruptcy and insolvency are impossible. It is then not terribly surprising that critical questions regarding the functioning of a modern market economy were never asked nor answered.
The contract economy
This is different in the alternative economic paradigm, which views the economy as a network of contracts and assigns a crucial role to money. It is influenced by the "banking view" of monetary theory. It goes back to Keynes and owes to Minsky, Shackle (1991) , Goodhart (1989), Stiglitz, and Riese (2001) . It sees market agents constrained by limited information and explains the need for money by its function of means of payment, caused by the existence of uncertainty (Goodhart, 1989) . In an uncertain world, where people lack trust in their trading partners' willingness and ability to make promised future payments, sellers of spot goods (goods that are delivered now) require immediate payment by transfer of a reliable asset. The asset, the transfer of which extinguishes debt obligations, is money (Keynes, 1930) , because money is liquidity and has the "advantage of immediacy" (Demsetz, 1968) .
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Holding money gives security. Giving up this advantage has a price: the interest rate. In an uncertain environment, liquidity trumps other assets. The higher the uncertainty in the economy, the higher the advantage and therefore the price for the safety of liquidity. A high price may lower the demand for credit, but could also create an adverse selection bias, which would constrain the supply of credit (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003) . Thus, trust and stability in the macroeconomic environment will increase the likelihood that people will pay with money, buy things and lend against promises.
Money is not printed paper dropped by helicopter. In a modern economy, money is a byproduct of credit, and liquidity is provided by the central bank. Central bank liabilities extinguish debt because they are legal tender, i.e. a legally certified claim to the assets owned by the bank. 8 Commercial banks obtain liquidity by "discounting" debt titles against central bank money, 9 debt they have themselves previously granted or acquired.
In other words, they transform their own claims for future money payments from clients into the immediate advantage of being able to make payments now. The need of banks and other agents to hold liquid assets as reserves allows the central bank to steer the interest rate in the money market and indirectly for the whole economy, because the rate, at which the central bank discounts securities from commercial banks, is the price for liquidity.
This has three implications: first, there is a structural shortage in the money market, created by the fact that when a loan plus interest are repaid, more money is needed to redeem the debt than initially borrowed. 10 This additional money must come from the 7 Economists tend to speak about liquidity, while lawyers refer to possession; both concepts express the advantage of immediacy. Shackle (1991: 12-13) summarized it: " Money does have a value in use, for it has value in possession, and not merely a mechanical and token value for perpetual exchange". 8 The certification by some authority (the state) is necessary, because in a contractual economy property is a claim to possession, and this claim has a representation in the liability side of the balance sheet. This distinction is easily blurred when thinking of money as gold or silver coins, which are simultaneously the asset and its representation. In fact the English term "asset" confounds possession with property. Third, the scarcity of money relative to resources yields the relative price signals that ensure the efficient allocation of resources in the context of general uncertainty (Keynes, 1936: 213-217) . In a zero interest rate economy, or in the exchange economy, a different mechanism for the allocation is needed. With the focus on utility, possession takes precedence over property, and power and hierarchies rather than promises and contracts determine the allocation of possessions. This changes not only the economy's long run dynamics, but also the society's political normativity. The exchange economy reproduces values of submission to authority; the contract economy is based on free and equal individuals, who conclude their social contract to manage their common affairs democratically.
The consequence is that capitalism cannot work properly with zero interest rates. In the long run, a zero interest rate policy leads to the euthanasia of capitalism, although not of the exchange economy. Economists working with the exchange paradigm see no other markets, notably the labour market, have a structural surplus (Riese, 2003) . 10 Unemployment is therefore logically an intrinsic feature of capitalism, although this statement says little about how much unemployment is compatible with a functioning credit economy. 11 For convenience let us call securities discountable at the central bank "bonds". 12 When the central bank is owned by the state, the cost of possible default is born by the treasury and covered by taxes. 13 We may also say that the exchange economy is the special case of a monetary economy where the interest rate is zero.
disadvantage in lowering interests to zero and dropping helicopter money in a depression. But a zero interest rate switches off the engine of growth. An example was the late Soviet Union, where money was no longer the economy's hard budget constraint.
14 Growth was planned by a centralized authority, but the system lacked the mechanism to sustain it. Similarly, it is possible that the Japanese economy has suffered from extremely low interest rates over the last decade. Classical economists have explained output expansion in a decentralized exchange economy by profit and greed.
But greed does not explain why individuals continue to labour and endure stress and hardship long after the greedy temptation has vanished. Without this persistence capitalism would long have disappeared. Greed is no equilibrium phenomenon. The human mind is fickle and so would be the choice between labour and leisure if greed were the only motivation. In the contract economy, profit opportunities may well be the carrot for starting economic activity, 15 but it is the obligation to service debt, the moral obligation to keep one's word, that forces individuals to persist in the production of wealth.
16
A positive interest rate is therefore a necessary requirement for money to remain scarce, and it is the cause for the long run expansion of capitalism. The economic mechanism is simple and powerful. In order to be able to service his or her debt and repay the credit plus interest, a borrower must generate a surplus, i.e. income over and above her immediate consumption. By definition, the difference between income and consumption are savings and the part of today's income that is available for future consumption is investment. If households borrow from each other for the sole purpose of consumption, the savings of one are consumed by the other and the net effect is zero. In aggregate, savings are only positive if aggregate income is higher than aggregate consumption.
This can be the result of an intertemporal substitution of consumption, or by an increase in aggregate income (the wealth effect). But at a given interest rate (i.e. with unchanged time preferences), there is no substitution effect; servicing the outstanding debt then requires producing additional output and selling it for money.
Public debt
We have so far focused on the logic of the moral economy of money in relation to private debt contracts. We must now introduce government. For Keynes public debt and fiscal policy were important when the economy was caught in the liquidity trap because interest rates were close to zero. But given his theory of money, fiscal policy did not imply that it should be the main economic policy tool.
There is a fundamental distinction between private and public debt. Private debt is redeemed by additional income; public debt is serviced by taxes, which lower future disposable income. Private borrowing for investment purposes therefore fosters wealth creation, while government borrowing does not. 20 The Ricardian equivalence theorem has derived this result from the fact that government bonds are not net wealth (Barro 1974) . It argues that given certain informational assumptions, rational consumers should internalize the government's budget constraint, whereby the present value of future tax liabilities is equal to the value of newly issued government debt. Tax payers will then reduce consumption today and save in order to pay for future taxes, so that the government's net borrowing leads to a substitution effect, and not to a wealth effect. The distinction is somewhat blurred at the margin. When taxpayers anticipate higher taxes (Ricardian equivalence), and if instead of lowering consumption they are increasing their output in order to pay (lump sum) taxes, then public debt may contribute to growth. Alternatively, if governments borrow to finance public investment that increases productivity and economic growth, public debt functions effectively like corporate debt.
(seignorage). This is equivalent to saying that if all government debt is monetized, it is in fact interest free (or zero rated) and government borrowing represents an increase in aggregate consumption and a net reduction in aggregate savings. If government debt is only partially monetized, the cost of government borrowing is effectively subsidized and government bonds are net wealth. Under these extreme conditions deficit spending is an unambiguous tool for macroeconomic stabilization policy. However, public borrowing does not generate any incentive for long run growth, because the debt service is covered by taxes, i.e. a reduction in disposable income, and not by an increase in output.
From a normative point of view, public debt does not generate contracts between free and equal citizens, but submission to tax authorities. Only in a democracy can citizens affirm the modern values of freedom and equality, insofar they are the sovereign and ultimate owner of the republic.
Political normativity
The two economic paradigms have also implications for political values and morality. In This normative framework of modernity is distinct from the holistic values that dominated traditional societies and nowadays re-appear in neo-conservative ideology. In the traditional society, the individual exits to serve the whole; for the modern individual, society is there to empower her individual self-realization. 21 In the pre-modern paradigm, resources are allocated by hierarchy and power and the holistic society demands the individual to surrender to the authority of the leader, the dogma of belief, the imperatives of community.
Not surprisingly these two views give rise to two very different interpretations of the State and government. In the traditional/holistic perspective, the State is the incarnation of hierarchical authority. It has the monopoly of power and can legitimately interfere with individuals' freedom. The modern view sees the State founded in the social contract by free and equal citizens, who are owners of common public goods as well as owners of private goods and decide themselves how to use these goods. Hence, the modern state is democratic, the traditional is authoritarian. It is the collective determination of the public good through democratic public deliberation and choice that gives citizens the positive liberty of determining their life plans, of being their own master. This distinction between the authoritarian and the democratic State is prior and more fundamental than the conflict between freedom and equality, between economic liberalism and social democracy.
The foundation of modern democracy is the contract economy. If free and equal citizens conclude the social contract, they must have equal rights to appoint governments as their agent, and to charge them with the implementation of policies which reflect their collective preferences. They need a government that is accountable. Contrary to the role of government in traditional societies, where legitimacy is derived from collective identity and cultural homogeneity, modern government is functional and preference choice oriented.
These normative considerations have important consequences for how one perceives the interaction between governments and markets. The Anti-Keynesian revolution by
Friedman and the monetarists in the 1970s has given priority to the exchange paradigm of microeconomics and ignored the need for macroeconomic policy in minimizing uncertainty. The reduction of liberty to the "negative" concept of non-interference has prevented using the democratic state as an instrument for positively defining the collective preferences of individual citizens. It therefore has also minimized the redistributive function of the State. Neoliberalism became a program to dismantle the social welfare State. Re-defining a new policy agenda for the post-neoliberal era requires a return to the fundamental norms of modernity.
Models of Capitalism
Although the credit economy has been the historic engine of growth, it has also generated increasing social inequality. Owners of securities have a claim on the increase of income and wealth. The accumulation of capital concentrates property in the hands of few, unless some form of redistribution re-establishes the balance. Thus, the freedom of economic liberalism remains purely formal, unless it is counterbalanced by principles of equality and fairness. The modern approach to redistribution is to use the democratic state for making laws that will establish a fair balance between economic freedom and equality according to citizens' tastes, even if the balance between these principles may shift over time.
Because citizens are the sovereign in a democratic state, legislation has to adapt to the general will of the people. The conservative approach is to use the authority of the state in conjunction with communitarian identity to restrain the unfettered liberty of markets.
Here, the will of the people has to adapt to the authority. Thus, if the monetary economy has generated freedom and equality as fundamental norms of modern contractual individualism, it has also created the modern democratic State. However, these principles have also interacted, sometimes uneasily, with the norms of traditional society. In other word, the political norms of modern contract based and those of traditional exchange economies are articulated in a variety of forms, in accordance to which norm becomes dominant. If conservatism takes over, individualism is suppressed. 
Models of welfare capitalism
The emergence of modern individualism as the dominant political philosophy did not mean that Europe had to converge to a single model of capitalism. In fact, despite the common normative structure of a modern contract economy, social models in Europe are highly diversified. Some countries have given greater weight to liberal market freedom, others to social equality. These political norms translate into specific institutional forms with respect to the regulation of capitalism. Each country has developed its own mechanism for providing social protection to less privileged groups and classes. Nevertheless, three basic models of welfare capitalism may be distinguished (2001) have argued that the choice of social models is not arbitrary and cannot be "switched" at will, because each institutional arrangement must be seen in its functional context. For example, the Anglo-Saxon model, which they call liberal market economy, is more short-term oriented due to the dominance of financial markets, and therefore also requires highly flexible labour markets; this institutional set-up supports product 22 For an overview see Sopart, 2005 innovation. By contrast, due to its banking regulations the German model of coordinated market economy has a long term bias and with that comes the labour market, that produces the German skill machine and a comparative advantage for product development. Edwards and Fischer (1994) have challenged the consensual view according to which the Anglo-Saxon model is capital market orientated and Germany is dominated by bankfinanced structures. Banks are not more involved with running businesses in Germany than in the USA. And the contagion of German banks by the meltdown in the US subprime market for mortgages is proof that even in Germany securitization had progressed significantly. Vitols (1998) found that at least until the 1990s the uniqueness of the German banking system lied (1) in its unusually high capacity to provide industrial finance in the form of long-term debt capital, and (2) in its avoidance of the "speculative boom-credit crunch cycle" experienced by almost every other advanced industrialized country in the 1980s and early 1990s. These two key characteristics are attributable to a regulatory framework, which involves strict prudential regulation, access to long-term refinancing sources, and a federalist form of corporatism. However, these features have been gradually eroded in recent years, due to the creation of a single European banking market, the globalization of capital markets and neoliberal economic policies. Nevertheless, these institutional characteristics have made an important contribution to Germany's spectacular economic stability after the introduction of Social Market Economy in 1949. Even if there is no way back to the early days, there may be lessons to be learned from Germany for a future restructuration of Europe's financial system.
Redefining the policy agenda in Europe
After the crisis, is there a future for capitalism? The financial crisis does not invalidate the viability of the system. But it challenges well-established believes about how the system works. Conservatives call for a return to the "real" economy and the "good old moral values" of decency and trust. But trust depends on systemic stability and this requires government action. There is today a real risk that one throws the baby out with the bath water, that the recognition of the excesses of the last decade leads to excessive repression of contractual liberty and undermines claims for social and political equality.
A paradigmatic shift has policy consequences. The first, economic, priority must be to stabilize the financial system, so that uncertainty is reduced and credit contracts become the engine of growth again that sustains the moral economy of money. This implies rules for financial regulation that restore trust in individual banks, and also macroeconomic policies that stabilize the economy. The second, political, priority must be to prevent conservatism from restricting individual freedom and political and social equality. Israel, 2004) , was the principle that people, citizens, are Sovereign, not governments. Citizens conclude the social contract to further their interests, not because they "belong" to a community with a given identity. Hence, European citizens must have the authority to agree on appointing a European government as the agent of their common concerns and interests.
An Economic Government for Europe?
The economic crisis opens the perspective for re-founding Europe's polity. A European government must assume responsibility for macroeconomic policies. Intergovernmental coordination can no longer guarantee welfare, because many macroeconomic policy issues require coherent and discretionary decisions, and binding guidelines or open methods of coordination are unable to produce them (Collignon, 2004 Monetarists have argued that the best instrument to overcome a financial crisis is by providing quasi-unlimited liquidity to the banking system. They see the cause for the crisis in the collapse of the money stock and seek restoring the flow of money to the economy through open market operations and "quantitative easing". They believe that if the central bank "prints" enough money, economic activity will return. However, a crucial requirement for this strategy to work is that financial markets operate smoothly, so that banks efficiently redistribute the liquidity provided by the central bank. Clearly, this is not the case in the present crisis.
The "banking view", which understands money as an information tool in an uncertain environment, allows a better assignment for monetary policy. Asymmetric information and lack of trust have disrupted the interbank market. In this context, the most important task is to preserve money's role as a reserve asset. Because of asymmetrical information and externalities in the interbank market, banks may be denied access to liquidity despite being solvent. Therefore they need assistance. The central bank must act as a lender of last resort. The IMF could also do so in the international context with respect to international reserve assets. The need for central banks to act as a lender of last resort the mistakes of the exchange paradigm that have led to the financial crisis in the first place.
Conclusion
To summarize, the future of capitalism is its past: credit and interest are the engine of growth in the modern economy, but also the normative foundation of capitalism. Like all morality, the moral economy of money is ambivalent: its functional norms are freedom and equality, the factual reality is material constraint and inequality. Average income per person is today 12 times higher than it was 200 years ago (Clark, 2007) and this development of "real wealth" would not have been possible without the financial sphere. But the system-immanent tendency for capital to create inequality requires an authority capable of leaning against the wind, of correcting social injustice, of providing a stable legal framework.
Capitalism remains a fragile construct: uncertainty makes it potentially unstable and the accumulation of wealth in the hands of few is a permanent challenge to the modern idea of justice, which is based on freedom and equality. 
